

# SMP model, PSM protocols, and their quantum analogues

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
# Outline

- Setting
  - SMP
  - PSM
- Results
- Open problems

# Communication Complexity



Andrew C.-C. Yao




**Communication complexity (CC)** of  $f: X \times Y \rightarrow Z$  := the length of bits communicated for computing  $f$  in the best communication protocol

- Consider the worst-case on all input pairs  $(x, y)$
- Tool for the lower bound proofs in computational complexity


# SMP Model

- SMP (Simultaneous Message Passing)
  - Most simplest setting in communication complexity
  - $CC^{smp}(f) := \text{CC of } f \text{ in the SMP model}$



# Example: PARITY

- $CC^{smp}(PARITY_n) = 2$





# Bounded-Error Setting

- Alice & Bob may use “randomness” (randomized protocol)
  - Referee do not always need to output the correct answer but needs to do it “with high probability” (say with probability  $2/3$ )
  - $RCC^{smp}(f)$  := bounded-error SMP complexity of  $f$
  - For comparison, the case that does not use randomness is called “exact”


# Bounded-Error Setting

- Alice & Bob may use randomness (randomized protocol)
  - Referee do not always need to output the correct answer but needs to do it with high probability (say with probability  $2/3$ )
  - $RCC^{smp}(f)$  := bounded-error SMP complexity of  $f$  (with private randomness)
- Two types for randomness
  - Private randomness: Alice & Bob (& Referee) must prepare randomness separately
  - Public (shared) randomness: Alice & Bob may share randomness
  - $RCC^{smp, pub}(f)$  := bounded-error SMP complexity of  $f$  (with shared randomness)



# Example: Equality

- $RCC^{smp, pub}(EQ_n) = O(1)$




# SMP complexity of EQ

- $CC^{smp}(EQ_n) = 2n$
- $RCC^{smp, pub}(EQ_n) = O(1)$
- $RCC^{smp}(EQ_n) = \Theta(\sqrt{n})$  [Amb96, NS96, BK97]

# Quantum SMP

- Alice & Bob may send qubits
  - Every party can use quantum computers
- 3 types of bounded-error QSMP
  - $QCC^{smp}(f)$ : no shared resource
  - $QCC^{smp, pub}(f)$ : shared randomness
  - $QCC^{smp,*}(f)$ : shared entanglement
- Exact case
  - $QCC_0^{smp}(f), QCC_0^{smp, pub}(f), QCC_0^{smp,*}(f)$



# SMP complexity of EQ

- Classical Case


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- Quantum Case

- $QCC_0^{smp}(EQ_n) = QCC_0^{smp,pub}(EQ_n) = 2n$
- $QCC_0^{smp,*}(EQ_n) = n$  [HSWCLS05]
- $QCC^{smp}(EQ_n) = O(\log n)$  [BCWW01]

# Extension to Multi-Party Case

- $k$ -party SMP complexity of function  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^k \rightarrow \{0,1\} :=$  the minimum number of bits sent to the referee  $R$  so that  $R$  can compute  $f$
- CC of the trivial protocol= $kn$




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# Multi-Party Computation (MPC)


- Jointly computes  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  with revealing nothing but  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$



# Communication Complexity of MPC

- Communication complexity of  $k$ -party MPC for function  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}$   
:= the minimum number of bits sent with one other to implement a MPC for  $f$


Q. How much is the communication complexity of MPC?





# PSM model


- PSM (Private Simultaneous Message)
  - Simplest MPC model [FKN94]; SMP + Security condition  
(security) Referee must not learn any information but  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$





# PSM model

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


For the security condition,  $P_1, \dots, P_k$  must mask their messages

$P_1, \dots, P_k$  **share randomness** (not known to the referee)

# Simulator: Formal definition of Security

- PSM (Private Simultaneous Message)
  - (correctness) The output of the referee is  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$
  - (security) There is an algorithm (simulator) that given  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  as input, produces the messages to the referee




$$CC^{psm}(f) := \text{CC of PSM for } f$$

# PSQM model

- PSQM (Private Simultaneous **Quantum** Message)

(correctness) The output of the referee is  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  (with probability 1)

(security) There is a quantum algorithm (simulator) that given  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  as input, produces the **quantum** messages to the referee




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# PSQM model with shared entanglement

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# Outline

- Setting
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- Results
  - Example
  - Known results
  - Our results
- Open problems

# Example: PSM for (2-party) Equality

- $EQ_n(x, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & (x = y) \\ 0 & (x \neq y) \end{cases}$

- PSM for  $EQ_n(x, y)$

- Identifies  $n$ -bit strings with elements in  $F_{2^n}$
- $P_1$  &  $P_2$  share random elements  $r_1 \in F_{2^n} \setminus \{0\}$  &  $r_2 \in F_{2^n}$ 
  1.  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  send  $m_1 = r_1x + r_2$  and  $m_2 = r_1y + r_2$ , respectively
  2.  $R$  outputs 1 iff  $m_1 = m_2$



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- $CC^{psm}(EQ_n) = 2n$

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  2.  $R$  outputs 1 iff  $m_1 = m_2$
- Simulator
  - On input 1: Take  $r \in_R F_{2^n}$  and output  $(r, r)$
  - On input 0: Take different  $r, r'$  from  $F_{2^n}$  uniformly at random and output  $(r, r')$

# Results on PSM: Upper bounds

- Feige, Kilian & Naor (1994)
  - Proposal of PSM model
  - 2-party PSM for “any” Boolean function with **exponential** CC
- Ishai & Kushilevitz (1997)
  - Efficient  $k$ -party PSM for any  $\#L$  function
- Many other PSM protocols for specific functions

# Results on PSM: Lower bounds


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- Many other PSM protocols for specific functions
- **Applebaum, Holenstein, Mishra & Shayevitz (2020)**
  - **$(3 - o(1))n$**  lower bounds of 2-party PSM for  $2n$ -input random functions
  - If no privacy requirement, trivial upper bound =  $2n$ 
    - ➔ Implies privacy essentially requires additional communication cost!

# Our model: PSQM model

- PSQM (Private Simultaneous **Quantum** Message)

(correctness) The output of the referee is  $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  (with probability 1)

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$$QCC_0^{psm}(f) := \text{CC of PSQM for } f$$

Q. Is there any non-trivial lower bounds?

# Our Result (1): 2-party case

- Applebaum, Holenstein, Mishra & Shayevitz (2020)
  - $(3 - o(1))n$  lower bounds of 2-party PSM for  $2n$ -input random functions
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**Result 1:** For  $1 - o(1)$  fraction of functions  $f: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ ,  
 $QCC_0^{psm}(f) \geq (3 - o(1))n$

- $(3 - o(1))n$  lower bounds of 2-party PSQM for  $2n$ -input random functions

# Our Result (1): 2-party case

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- $(3 - o(1))n$  lower bounds of 2-party PSQM for  $2n$ -input random functions
- Quantum extension of the combinatorial argument by Applebaum et al
  - Run the PSM protocol twice, and consider the collision probability  $\Pr[m^1 = m^2]$  of the two messages
  - $\Pr[m^1 = m^2] \geq 1/|\text{message domain}|$
  - Analyze an upper bound of  $P[m^1 = m^2]$




# PSQM model with shared entanglement

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$QCC_0^{psm,*}(f) := \text{CC of PSQM with shared entanglement for } f$

Q. Are  $QCC_0^{psm}(f)$  and  $QCC_0^{psm,*}(f)$  different?

# Shared randomness vs shared entanglement

Q. Are  $QCC^{psm}(f)$  and  $QCC^{psm,*}(f)$  different?

For SMP model (=PSM with no security);

- There is a relation problem such that  $CC^{smp,*}$  is exponentially smaller than  $QCC^{smp,pub}$  [GKRW09]
  - ⊙ Bounded-error result & exponential gap
  - △ Not a Boolean function
- There is a partial function such that  $CC_0^{smp,*}$  is exponentially smaller than  $CC_0^{smp} = CC_0^{smp,pub}$  [BCT99]
  - △ Exact case
  - Partial Boolean function
  - ⊙ Exponential gap

# Our Result (2): 2-party case

- There is a partial function such that  $CC_0^{smp,*}$  is exponentially smaller than  $CC_0^{smp} = CC_0^{smp,pub}$  [BCT99]
  - △ Exact case
  - Partial Boolean function
  - ◎ Exponential gap

**Result 2:** There is a partial function such that  $CC_0^{psm,*}$  is exponentially smaller than  $QCC_0^{smp}$

- Uses the function in [BCT99] (distributed Deutsch-Jozsa function)
  - $DJ_n(x, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & (x = y) \\ 0 & (Ham(x, y) = n/2) \end{cases}$
- Adds the security condition
- Shows the **quantum** SMP complexity lower bound

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  - △ Exact case
  - Partial Boolean function
  - ⊙ Exponential gap
- Total function  $EQ_n$  has  $QCC_0^{smp}(EQ_n) = 2n$  and  $QCC_0^{smp,*}(EQ_n) = n$  [HSWCLS05]
  - △ Exact case
  - ⊙ Total Boolean function
  - △ Not large gap (but the best known gap for total functions including in the bounded-error setting)

# Our Result (3): $k$ -party case

- Total function  $EQ_n$  has  $QCC_0^{smp}(EQ_n) = 2n$  and  $QCC_0^{smp,*}(EQ_n) = n$  [HSWCLS05]
  - △ Exact case
  - ◎ Total Boolean function
  - △ Not large gap (but the best known gap for total functions including in the bounded-error setting)

**Result 3:** A  $k$ -party total function  $GEQ_n(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  (where  $x_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ ) has  $QCC_0^{psm}(GEQ_n) = kn$  and  $QCC_0^{psm,*}(GEQ_n) = \frac{kn}{2}$

- $GEQ_n(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k) = 1$  iff  $\sum_{j=1}^k (x_j)_i = 0$  for all  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$
- $GEQ_n(x_1, x_2) = EQ_n(x_1, x_2)$
- Multiparty extension of a protocol for  $QCC_0^{smp,*}(EQ_n) +$  security
- Uses the cat state  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0^k\rangle + |1^k\rangle)$  for two bits

# Simplest case: $n = k = 2$

PSQM protocol for  $EQ(x_1, x_2)$

- Shared:  $|\Psi^{00}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle_1|0\rangle_2 + |1\rangle_1|1\rangle_2)$  &  $r \in F_4$
- 1.  $P_j$  applies  $X$  ( $Z$ , resp.) on register  $j$  iff the 1<sup>st</sup> (2<sup>nd</sup>, resp) bit of  $rx_j$  is 1
- 2.  $P_j$  sends register  $j$  to  $R$
- 3.  $R$  measures registers 1 & 2 in the Bell basis  $\{|\Psi^{ab}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle|a\rangle + (-1)^b|1\rangle|1-a\rangle): a, b \in \{0,1\}\}$ , and the result corresponds to  $|\Psi^{00}\rangle$  iff 1 is outputed

1\2	00	01	10	11
00	$ \Psi^{00}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{01}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{10}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{11}\rangle$
01	$ \Psi^{01}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{00}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{11}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{10}\rangle$
10	$ \Psi^{10}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{11}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{00}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{01}\rangle$
11	$ \Psi^{11}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{10}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{01}\rangle$	$ \Psi^{00}\rangle$

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# Open Problems (1)

**Result 1:** For  $1 - o(1)$  fraction of functions  $f: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ ,  
 $QCC_0^{psm}(f) \geq (3 - o(1))n$

OPEN:

- Extension to the shared entanglement case
- Extension to the bounded-error case
- Extension to a relaxed security condition
  - Simulator  $\Rightarrow$  Approximate simulator
  - Shown in the classical case by Applebaum et al. (2020)
- Not well-studied even in the classical case



# Open Problems (2)

**Result 2:** There is a partial function such that  $CC_0^{psm,*}$  is exponentially smaller than  $QCC_0^{smp}$

**Result 3:** A  $k$ -party total function  $GEQ_n(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$  (where  $x_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ ) has  $QCC_0^{psm}(GEQ_n) = kn$  and  $QCC_0^{psm,*}(GEQ_n) = \frac{kn}{2}$

OPEN:

- Bounded-error & relaxed security cases
  - $\exists$  relational problem  $R$  [ $CC^{psm,*}(R) = O(\log n)$  but  $QCC^{psm}(R) = \Omega(\frac{n^{1/3}}{\log n})$ ] [GKRW09]
- Bigger gaps for total functions (even in the SMP case)

# Open Problems (3)

- $QCC^{psm}$  vs  $CC^{psm}$

Cf.  $QCC^{smp}(EQ_n) = O(\log n)$  but  $CC^{smp}(EQ_n) = \Theta(\sqrt{n})$

- PSQM for “quantum” problems

THE END